Perspective on Pentagon "Pwnage"
Last night, Daniel Kennedy posted on his blog about a vulnerability in the Pentagon's web site. The vulnerability that was identified used XSS to steal session cookies. The story bothered me for a few reasons. Partially because it's usually a great blog, and the wording of the post made the vulnerability sound worse than it was. Daniel has since changed the wording, and I'm perfectly okay with that.
On to the exploit. My first reaction was that it isn't news. To begin with, the vulnerability is an old, known one- posted to XSSed last April. The site with the vulnerability contains no sensitive information, and unless you want to force somebody to book a tour of the Pentagon, really doesn't appear that useful at first brush. On top of this, there is no shortage of XSS vulnerabilities in much more sensitive .gov and .mil sites. The biggest story here really is that this vulnerability has been known for so long, and still has not been patched. Sadly, lack of fixes for every found XSS vulnerabilty isn't exactly a rare thing either.
I truly believe that XSS is one of the biggest threats on the web today. I'm not one to trivialize this kind of thing, but this one is small. As far as XSS holes go, this is about as trivial as can be. That said, this is still very dangerous.
Remember my cross-subdomain cookie attacks paper from last month? This is a perfect example of how widespread these issues are. The military has a hierarchical structure. It makes sense to give military websites a hierarchical structure. In this case, the domain with the vulnerability is pentagon.afis.osd.mil. Each of these subdomains means something- .mil for military, .osd for "Office of the Secretary of Defense," .afis. for "Armed Forces Information Services", and pentagon stands for, well, the Pentagon. Each department can have its own website, and its sub-departments have subdomains.
This is exactly how the web was designed. Academic Institutions' (.edu) websites also use this model heavily. It makes sense, particularly given the military and academic background of the web. Unfortunately, due to the cross-subdomain leakage of cookies described in my previous paper, any osd.mil website (there are hundreds, if not thousands of them, in various departments, serving various functions, and with various levels of sensitive data, user interaction, and exploitability) can be attacked due to this single, seemingly useless XSS hole.
As noted, finding such an XSS hole is rarely difficult. In less than half an hour, I was able to find half a dozen such domains vulnerable to XSS, some vulnerable to much worse. Most of those websites are simple informational websites, but there are a few with user logins, adminstrative sections, and sensitive data. This is where things get really scary.
Putting XSS in Perspective
After all that doom and gloom, I want to put this in perspective. As bad as an XSS hole is, it still requires somebody with the right level of access to click on it. Not necessarily hard, but definitely harder than a more direct exploit such as, for example, SQL injection. If somebody documents an XSS hole, they have not "hacked" that server. The Pentagon's website has not been "pwned." XSS is, and should be considered, a critical issue, but, at risk of appearing to agree with one of the dumbest quotes in the history of web security, it isn't generally used to hack into servers. Usually, that's not the point anyways- the attackers are after information, not a root shell.
Keep in mind, this is not a checklist of things you can and can't do with XSS. Don't use this in a risk assessment. Don't even quote me on it. This is just an attempt to put a realistic perspective around stories like the one mentioned above. I've seen too many headlines saying "$SITE Is Serving Malware!" or "$COMPANY Is Bad At Security" when there is no evidence of that happening. Web security is in a pretty dismal state right now, but spreading ungrounded FUD is simply not useful.
A single XSS vulnerability doesn't mean a company is bad at security. Frankly, a non-trivial application that is completely free of vulnerabilities is like a unicorn: It might exist, people claim to have seen them, but I have my doubts. I'd love to see organizations be more careful here, but in my experience, XSS vulnerabilities somewhere on a network is a virtual certainty. Security-wise, the key issue is what controls are in place to limit data leakage. News-wise, the key issue is how the organization responds to a vulnerability report.
XSS attacks are, by themselves, not actually very useful. However, they are attacks that stack beatifully with CSRF, credential theft, and clickjacking. They can also be leveraged nicely against vulnerable browsers and plugins to attack the client himself. It's worth noting though- unless you're stealing sensitive information directly from the page you're embedding the exploit in, it takes more than just XSS to do something malicious.
An XSS vulnerability in an application with sensitive data or access to sensitive resources (such as an internal network) is a serious matter indeed. A single targeted attack can compromise the data or allow an attacker to use the increased access of that user's browser as a jumping-off point for further attacks.
If that application is also popular, it is even more serious. The attack doesn't need to be targeted: it can be used in drive-by attacks or worms to hit a large number of users. As common as it is, this is in my opinion a worst-case scenario for XSS.
An XSS vulnerability can be used to anonymize attacks, but from what I've seen, attackers rarely bother. Using it this way generally just adds complexity without a lot of added benefit.
With cross-subdomain cookie attacks, an XSS vulnerability in one subdomain may attack another subdomain. Domains with many applications on their namespace (such as osd.mil) probably have other, more sensitive applications. Check before you disregard such a vulnerability on a non-sensitive application. They also may not. Check before you get too excited.
XSS works remarkably well for phishing. Currently, it's not particularly common to see it used this way, but it's happened before, and it will happen a lot more in the future.
There are many more uses for XSS, and there are just as many controls (ineffective as they are) for limiting XSS. The actual risks presented by an XSS vulnerability are extremely dependent on environment- the application, the server, other servers within the namespace, the web browsers being exploited, and security controls that are in place. Making vague statements about XSS vulnerabilities isn't particularly useful, and in most cases borders on FUD.
On to the exploit. My first reaction was that it isn't news. To begin with, the vulnerability is an old, known one- posted to XSSed last April. The site with the vulnerability contains no sensitive information, and unless you want to force somebody to book a tour of the Pentagon, really doesn't appear that useful at first brush. On top of this, there is no shortage of XSS vulnerabilities in much more sensitive .gov and .mil sites. The biggest story here really is that this vulnerability has been known for so long, and still has not been patched. Sadly, lack of fixes for every found XSS vulnerabilty isn't exactly a rare thing either.
I truly believe that XSS is one of the biggest threats on the web today. I'm not one to trivialize this kind of thing, but this one is small. As far as XSS holes go, this is about as trivial as can be. That said, this is still very dangerous.
Remember my cross-subdomain cookie attacks paper from last month? This is a perfect example of how widespread these issues are. The military has a hierarchical structure. It makes sense to give military websites a hierarchical structure. In this case, the domain with the vulnerability is pentagon.afis.osd.mil. Each of these subdomains means something- .mil for military, .osd for "Office of the Secretary of Defense," .afis. for "Armed Forces Information Services", and pentagon stands for, well, the Pentagon. Each department can have its own website, and its sub-departments have subdomains.
This is exactly how the web was designed. Academic Institutions' (.edu) websites also use this model heavily. It makes sense, particularly given the military and academic background of the web. Unfortunately, due to the cross-subdomain leakage of cookies described in my previous paper, any osd.mil website (there are hundreds, if not thousands of them, in various departments, serving various functions, and with various levels of sensitive data, user interaction, and exploitability) can be attacked due to this single, seemingly useless XSS hole.
As noted, finding such an XSS hole is rarely difficult. In less than half an hour, I was able to find half a dozen such domains vulnerable to XSS, some vulnerable to much worse. Most of those websites are simple informational websites, but there are a few with user logins, adminstrative sections, and sensitive data. This is where things get really scary.
Putting XSS in Perspective
After all that doom and gloom, I want to put this in perspective. As bad as an XSS hole is, it still requires somebody with the right level of access to click on it. Not necessarily hard, but definitely harder than a more direct exploit such as, for example, SQL injection. If somebody documents an XSS hole, they have not "hacked" that server. The Pentagon's website has not been "pwned." XSS is, and should be considered, a critical issue, but, at risk of appearing to agree with one of the dumbest quotes in the history of web security, it isn't generally used to hack into servers. Usually, that's not the point anyways- the attackers are after information, not a root shell.
Keep in mind, this is not a checklist of things you can and can't do with XSS. Don't use this in a risk assessment. Don't even quote me on it. This is just an attempt to put a realistic perspective around stories like the one mentioned above. I've seen too many headlines saying "$SITE Is Serving Malware!" or "$COMPANY Is Bad At Security" when there is no evidence of that happening. Web security is in a pretty dismal state right now, but spreading ungrounded FUD is simply not useful.
A single XSS vulnerability doesn't mean a company is bad at security. Frankly, a non-trivial application that is completely free of vulnerabilities is like a unicorn: It might exist, people claim to have seen them, but I have my doubts. I'd love to see organizations be more careful here, but in my experience, XSS vulnerabilities somewhere on a network is a virtual certainty. Security-wise, the key issue is what controls are in place to limit data leakage. News-wise, the key issue is how the organization responds to a vulnerability report.
XSS attacks are, by themselves, not actually very useful. However, they are attacks that stack beatifully with CSRF, credential theft, and clickjacking. They can also be leveraged nicely against vulnerable browsers and plugins to attack the client himself. It's worth noting though- unless you're stealing sensitive information directly from the page you're embedding the exploit in, it takes more than just XSS to do something malicious.
An XSS vulnerability in an application with sensitive data or access to sensitive resources (such as an internal network) is a serious matter indeed. A single targeted attack can compromise the data or allow an attacker to use the increased access of that user's browser as a jumping-off point for further attacks.
If that application is also popular, it is even more serious. The attack doesn't need to be targeted: it can be used in drive-by attacks or worms to hit a large number of users. As common as it is, this is in my opinion a worst-case scenario for XSS.
An XSS vulnerability can be used to anonymize attacks, but from what I've seen, attackers rarely bother. Using it this way generally just adds complexity without a lot of added benefit.
With cross-subdomain cookie attacks, an XSS vulnerability in one subdomain may attack another subdomain. Domains with many applications on their namespace (such as osd.mil) probably have other, more sensitive applications. Check before you disregard such a vulnerability on a non-sensitive application. They also may not. Check before you get too excited.
XSS works remarkably well for phishing. Currently, it's not particularly common to see it used this way, but it's happened before, and it will happen a lot more in the future.
There are many more uses for XSS, and there are just as many controls (ineffective as they are) for limiting XSS. The actual risks presented by an XSS vulnerability are extremely dependent on environment- the application, the server, other servers within the namespace, the web browsers being exploited, and security controls that are in place. Making vague statements about XSS vulnerabilities isn't particularly useful, and in most cases borders on FUD.
Labels: XSS
posted by mckt at
12:23 PM
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3 Comments
